China Bans Exports of Dual-Use Items to Japanese Military and Expands Re-Export Liability

MOFCOM Announcement 1/2026 resembles—and goes beyond—Announcement 46/2024; immediate effect; re-export ban for PRC-origin items

Executive Summary

• Announcement 1/2026 prohibits export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, military uses, and "all other end-user uses that contribute to Japan's military capabilities." effective immediately (January 6, 2026).
• Re-export clause: Entities anywhere that transfer or provide PRC-origin dual-use items to Japan in violation are legally liable under Chinese law.
• Parallel to Ann. 46/2024 (US): Bans dual-use items to US military users/uses with extraterritorial re-export liability. Key difference: Japan measure adds new, broader "contribute to military capabilities" language.
• No goods-specific bans: Unlike Ann. 46/2024's now-suspended second clause (gallium/germanium to all US recipients, suspended by Ann. 72/2025 until November 27, 2026), Ann. 1/2026 contains no goods-specific bans.
• Compliance focus: Enhanced Japan end-user screening; assess "contribution to military capabilities" across contractors, labs, integrators; review PRC-origin content and re-export pathways.

What Announcement 1/2026 Says 

Clause	Content
Clause 1 (Substantive ban)	All dual-use items prohibited to be exported to Japanese military users, military uses, and all other end-user uses that contribute to Japan's military capabilities
Clause 2 (Re-export liability)	Organizations and individuals in any country/region that transfer or provide PRC-origin dual-use items to Japan in violation will be held legally responsible
Effective	Date of promulgation (January 6, 2026)

Comparison: Ann. 1/2026 (Japan) vs. Ann. 46/2024 (US)

Common core:

• Blanket prohibition on exports of dual-use items to military users/uses of target country
• Re-export ban for PRC-origin dual-use items

Key divergences:

Element	Ann. 46/2024 (USA)	Ann. 1/2026 (Japan)
Military ban	All dual-use items to US military users/uses	All dual-use items to Japanese military users/uses
Expanded language	—	"and all other end-user uses that contribute to Japan's military capabilities"
Goods-specific ban	Gallium, germanium, antimony, superhard materials to any US recipient (Clause 2) – suspended by Ann. 72/2025	None
Re-export clause	Yes (Art. 49 Dual-Use Reg.)	Yes (identical structure)

Practical takeaway: Japan scope may require enhanced scrutiny on "end user/uses," even without goods-specific bans.

Interpreting the New Phrase: "all other end-user uses that contribute to Japan's military capabilities"

This language appears to extend the prohibition beyond direct military end-users to the broader defense industrial base. The phrase likely captures any transaction where the end-use—even if nominally civilian—feeds into Japan's defense ecosystem, including defense contractor manufacturing, government-funded R&D at universities or labs, and system integration for platforms with military applications. To date, no official MOFCOM guidance has been released; a conservative approach is advised.

Key risk indicators include funding of Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD) or Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), contracts referencing defense programs, classified work, export-license narratives denoting defense applications. Companies should document end-use diligence wherever civilian narratives might indirectly support defense capability.

Re-Export: What It Means

• Definition in this context: Any transfer outside China of PRC-origin dual-use items by non-PRC entities to Japan—in violation of the measure—can trigger PRC liability.
• Ann. 1/2026 uses the same extraterritorial posture as Ann. 46/2024's final paragraph (based on Art. 49 Dual-Use Regulation).
• Note: Ann. 61/2025's formal rare-earths re-export regime and 0.1% de minimis threshold are suspended by Ann. 70/2025 until November 10, 2026; Ann. 1/2026 stands on its own and does not import a de minimis threshold.

"Chinese Origin" Under Ann. 1/2026

The re-export clause (Clause 2) strictly penalizes the transfer of dual-use items "originating in the People's Republic of China." European manufacturers may seek to avoid the re-export ban by arguing that a product is not of PRC origin. 

Working Interpretation (No specific Ann. 1/2026 guidance): Consistent with MOFCOM practice under Announcement 46/2024 and Announcement 18/2025, the "Chinese origin" of a dual-use item may be severed by substantial processing abroad.

• The "Deeply Processed" Argument: This concept originates primarily from MOFCOM Q&As regarding rare earth magnets, which clarified that "deeply processed products" (e.g., motors or electronic devices containing magnets) do not fall under the control regime for the raw material. Legal arguments supporting this position—including definitions in the Dual-Use List's General Notes, which limit control to components that "can be removed and used for other purposes"—could arguably be applied to the "PRC origin" question under Announcement 46/2024 and could potentially be extended to Announcement 1/2026. However, it is advisable to await future MOFCOM guidance.
• Application to Japan: If a European company imports Chinese dual-use components (e.g., sensors, magnets) and processes them into a substantially different new product (e.g., a complete machine or vehicle) in Europe, it could be argued that the end product is no longer of "PRC origin" and therefore does not fall under the re-export ban.

Caution: This is likely to remain a risk-based, case-by-case assessment. Robust origin documentation appears advisable, as "PRC-origin" could potentially be asserted more broadly in sensitive Japan-facing cases, especially where controlled subcomponents remain identifiable and function-determining.

What Is NOT in Ann. 1/2026

• No list of specific product categories beyond "dual-use items" and accordingly no goods-specific "to all Japanese entities" ban (unlike Ann. 46's now-suspended Clause 2)
• No thresholds (e.g., 0.1% de minimis)

Immediate Compliance Implications

Screen Japan buyers and consignee chains for:

• Military users (JSDF, MOD, procurement agencies)
• Defense contractors, system integrators, labs tied to military programs
• Civilian end-uses that credibly "contribute to military capabilities"

Tighten documentation:

• Update end-use questionnaires for Japan-bound shipments
• Require non-diversion clauses referencing Ann. 1/2026
• Strengthen contract reps/warranties

Re-export risk management:

• Identify PRC-origin dual-use content in foreign-made goods destined for Japan
• Assess whether substantial transformation can be substantiated
• If not, avoid Japan re-exports where military-contribution risk exists

Incident preparedness:

• Establish internal escalation channel when Japan and defense are both implicated

Note on Sources and Interpretation

No official implementing guidance has been released as of publication. Interpretations are provisional, based on the text of Ann. 1/2026, parallels to Ann. 46/2024, Ann. 72/2025, and MOFCOM practice. The official MOFCOM announcement is available at: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_8990fedae8fa462eb02cc9bae5034e91.html